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The research presented in this dissertation represents three 
distinct types of issues influencing demand. Chapter II examines 
how a policy change affected revenues. The results show that 
there was a financial incentive to not enact and enforce a 
policy punishing users of performance enhancing drugs. Chapter 
III measures the change in demand for teams attributable to 
foreign-born players on the squad. The results show fans have 
changed their bias from anti- to pro-foreign players over the 
period from 1985-2005. Chapter IV questions how fans level of 
consumption is affected by the relative uncertainty of a game 
and season’s outcome. The findings are that fans prefer to 
attend games when their team is in a better position to make the 
playoffs, when the game itself is important to determining 
playoff qualification, and when their team’s standing is similar 
to that of the previous season. While each study represents a 
different subset of studies within the literature on sport 
economics, each is aimed specifically at learning more about fan 





Demand for sporting events becomes an increasingly 
vital topic as the interest in professional sports 
continues to grow.  In 2006, over 76 million fans attended 
regular-season Major League Baseball (MLB) games, over 
three times as many as had attended just 20 years earlier.  
At an average ticket price of $22 apiece, that comes to 
roughly $1.67 billion in ticket revenue alone.  That figure 
does not even take into account ancillary local revenues 
such as parking and concessions.  Academic work on demand 
has similarly flourished during that time.  Studies of 
demand in sports cover game and yearly attendance, the 
impact of stars, team quality, facility, temporal factors, 
and work stoppages, uncertainty of outcome, competitive 
balance, excess demand for tickets, and the secondary 
ticket market, to name a few.  As preferences are prone to 
change—as evidenced in sports by the recent decline in 
interest in the NHL, declining NBA television ratings, and 
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emerging popularity of NASCAR—this line of inquiry promises 
to remain relevant to practitioners and scholars alike.  
 
The work conducted for my dissertation comes in three 
distinct projects, each under the umbrella of estimating 
demand in a major North American professional sports 
league, MLB.  Chapter II examines the introduction of a new 
league policy and estimates the related change in revenues.  
Specifically, it looks at Major League Baseball’s 
performance-enhancing drug policy and shows how its 
institution impacted gate attendance.  Chapter III applies 
tried and true methods for measuring consumer 
discrimination in sports on a previously unexplored group.  
There is a vast literature on race and gender 
discrimination in sports.  This study’s novelty is that it 
looks at country-of-origin as an input in estimating fan 
attendance at MLB games and attempts to find the source of 
that bias.  Chapter IV explores game attendance in Major 
League Baseball and incorporates the most detailed metrics 
of uncertainty introduced in an academic work.  In addition 
to quantifying all types of uncertainty, it applies the 
parameters to estimating demand. 
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Where the three aforementioned studies diverge is in 
the angle of inquiry taken in estimating owner revenues.  
The league can be thought of as the collection of its 
owners.  So when the league, by way of the commissioner’s 
office, institutes a new policy, it is the owners who have 
decided that the benefits of the new policy outweigh the 
costs.  Such is the case of MLB’s steroid policy.  Although 
I can, and do, quantify the change in revenue for each 
owner, the decision-making unit is the collection of 
owners.  In contrast to the work covered in Chapter II, 
player personnel decisions, the focus of Chapter III, rest 
in the hands of each individual team.  While some leagues 
have historically restricted the number of international 
players, MLB has never done so.  When considering the 
marginal change in revenue associated with hiring a 
foreign-born player, it would be prudent for that team’s 
management to be aware of the implications.  The league, as 
the collection of owners, is only concerned with this hire 
inasmuch as the collective bottom line is altered via 
revenue sharing.  Once again, however, league policy comes 
into play in broaching whether there should be regulations 
in the signing of foreign players.  This is somewhat akin 
to Chapter II in that the scheduling of contests falls 
under league commission.  The subtle difference here is 
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that scheduling, unlike the performance-enhancing drug 
policy, is one of the very basic duties of the league 
necessary in order to make play happen.  The underlying 
question, therefore, is not whether or not to implement the 
policy, rather how to best implement scheduling to maximize 
revenues while taking into account other considerations 
such as fairness of play.  For example, MLB attendance may 
be far greater in St. Louis than in many other host cities, 
but arranging additional home games for the Cardinals when 
home field provides a competitive advantage would 
contradict the charge of the league to create a fair 
regular season schedule.  The other component of this 
chapter, uncertainty, closely resembles the steroid 
question in that it falls on the league to understand the 
implications of uncertainty in establishing league policy. 
 
Analytical Techniques 
The work that composes this dissertation use a 
multitude of well-established techniques to investigate the 
questions posed.  Each of the chapters uses regression to 
predict the attendance at games under a given set of 
conditions, an accepted convention in the previous 
literature in setting a proxy for demand.  I caution the 
reader to not overstate the effects found as these can only 
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be confidently applied to the manner in which they 
influence attendance and not other revenues.  Furthermore, 
this research focuses only on Major League Baseball. Thus, 
when statements are made regarding fan tendencies, I am 
referring to the tendencies of baseball fans and additional 
research would be necessary to draw similar conclusions 
about other leagues.  The subsequent discussion details the 
additional methodology specific to that section, to be 
further expounded upon in each respective chapter. 
 
Demand is estimated in Chapter II using runs as a 
predictor along with other factors known to affect 
attendance, the dependent variable.  The list includes 
predictors of quality, expectations, population size, and 
indicator variables for strike years.  All of these are 
placed into the model and regressed using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) on the log of attendance.  The logarithm is 
employed for ease of comparing percentages.  Then, using 
log of runs as the dependent variable and by controlling 
for other factors known to affect scoring, such as park 
factor1, it is possible to calculate the difference between 
expected and actual run production in the post-steroid era. 
                     
1 Park factor (PF) indicates the difference between runs scored in a 
team's home and road games. It is calculated by the formula: 
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Demand for international players was estimated using a 
similar design.  The notable methodological differences 
between this and the regression analysis mentioned above 
are the use of Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression 
and a robust covariance matrix.  GLS is used to control for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  The covariance 
matrix was used because there was a reasonable expectation 
that the error terms would be correlated within teams in 
different seasons.  An additional metric was calculated in 
an effort to study the effect of matching team and market 
international populations.  The matching figure was 
computed by summing the products of proportion of team and 
market in each season for each country. 
 
Chapter IV tests the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis 
(UOH).  Broadly based on Simon Rottenberg’s original 
contention, UOH posits that fans want their teams to have a 
reasonable opportunity to compete to win games and 
championships.  Subsequent research divided the notions of 
                                                             
 
where RS is runs scored, RA is runs against and home and road 
correspond to whether the team is playing at its home park or at a 
visiting park.  Thus, park factors over 1 are said to be hitter 
friendly and those under 1 pitcher friendly. 
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game and championship uncertainty, later adding a third 
category of consecutive season uncertainty.  I use game-by-
game data to build a probit model to determine the 
probability of success in a given game in order to evaluate 
the uncertainty involved in that game and, by 
extrapolation, season.  Game-by-game attendance was then 
employed as the dependent variable to evaluate the relative 
merit of several metrics measuring game, playoff, and 
consecutive season uncertainty controlling for other 
factors previously demonstrated to influence demand.  Once 
again the log form of attendance is used. 
 
Dissertation Layout 
This first chapter provides an overview of each of the 
three studies that comprise my dissertation.  Along with an 
introduction to each paper and an overview of basic 
methodology, a summary of the larger findings is presented.  
Chapter II presents MLB’s performance-enhancing drug 
policy’s impact on league revenues.  Chapter III details 
the evolution of fan discrimination with respect to 
international players over the past 20 years.  Chapter IV 
offers a short-run demand analysis of twelve MLB seasons 
and presents novel findings on the Uncertainty of Outcome 
Hypothesis.  It also uses a probit model to estimate game 
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and playoff uncertainty, and then tests metrics based on 
the probit results for significance in the model.  A short 
conclusion is presented in Chapter V. 
 
Summary of Findings 
In Chapter II the model shows that implementing drug 
testing with genuine punitive repercussions had an impact 
on revenues in MLB.  The first model demonstrates scoring 
as a significant predictor of gate attendance while the 
second quantifies the decreased run production attributable 
to steroid testing.  Estimates of lost revenues for each 
team are then calculated. 
 
Chapter III shows that fans’ preferences vis-à-vis 
foreign-born players changed during the period studied, 
1985-2005.  At the outset there was evidence of 
discrimination against international players.  This 
steadily decreased to the point that, all else equal, there 
was a preference for foreign players.  This peaked right 
around the year 2000, but has been flattened out since.  
The lack of significance of the matching statistic suggests 
that the source of bias is not in the population of 





Chapter IV covers game-by-game demand for MLB from 
1996-2007.  The research shows that when all aspects of 
uncertainty are incorporated into the same model, playoff 
uncertainty is the most influential on demand.  The 
importance of the game in terms of playoff qualification is 
a significant indicator of attendance, as are the 
probability a team will make the playoffs and, 
interestingly, the change in performance from the same 









Sports leagues create policies for a variety of 
reasons.  Some leagues have a salary cap or a luxury tax to 
increase competitive balance.  Other leagues have ownership 
policies, presumably to ensure that owners’ incentives are 
closely aligned with league incentives.  Game rules are 
typically set for player safety and enjoyment of the fans.  
Most of these policies are somehow related to league 
revenues.  One way leagues might increase demand is by 
creating more offense or scoring, since some fans want more 
scoring (Fort, 2006).  Baseball experienced an offensive 
surge in the 1990s (see Figure 2.1) that could be 
attributed to a number of factors, among them the use of 
steroids (Bryant, 2004).  It was not until Congress 
intervened on March 17, 2005 that Major League Baseball 
(MLB) stringently tested its players and punished the 
offenders.  This work illustrates the financial incentives 
of not having a meaningful steroid policy in MLB from the 
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time the league acknowledged their presence in the game 
until finally implementing a policy. 
 
At least the first half of the old football adage 
“offense sells tickets, defense wins championships” seems 
to be true in baseball.  Because it appeals to fans, 
increased offense, or run production, is desirable to MLB 
owners as it has been shown to, ceteris paribus, boost 
attendance (Winfree, McCluskey, Mittelhammer, and Fort 
2004; Domazlicky and Kerr 1990).  If there was a link or 
even a perceived link between steroids and offense, then 
MLB owners had an incentive to not institute a steroid 
policy that would decrease steroid use.  San Diego Padres 
general manager Kevin Towers admitted to knowing and 
feeling guilty about not speaking up about his third 
baseman and 1996 National League Most Valuable Player (MVP) 
Ken Caminiti’s steroid use.  He further added his belief 
that general managers all across the league knew about it 
(steroid use), but did not say anything due in part to the 
success of the players (Towers in NY Times, 2005).  Peter 
Magowan, managing general partner of the San Francisco 
Giants, is even more explicit about ownership’s complicity 
in his admission that steroid problems were overlooked for 
far too long (Magowan in Jenkins, 2005).   
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Steroids and other performance enhancing drugs have 
been a growing issue in many sports over the past two 
decades.  Besides baseball, players have been tested 
positive for steroids in the National Football League 
(American football), Tour de France champions have failed 
blood tests, and a myriad of Olympic champions have failed 
doping tests.  Sports such as football, rugby, and cricket 
too have also had players test positive for performance 
enhancing drugs.  While I use MLB as a context, this study 
illustrates the incentive for leagues to not be vigilant in 
finding athletes who use steroids or other drugs.  It may 
be the case that demand for the National Football League 
increases when athletes are bigger or that cycling and 
Olympic fans prefer to see records broken.  If this is the 
case, there are benefits to owners and organizing 
committees to ignore certain athlete behavior.  However, to 
my knowledge, most other sports league and organizations 
have been more proactive than MLB on this issue.  
Regardless, if society wants athletes to stop using 
performance enhancing drugs, league owners or organizations 
may not be the most vigilant.  This may be especially 
important since many feel that performance enhancing drug 
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use will continue at least into the near future (Lippi and 
Guidi 2004). 
 
Although the impact of steroids on baseball 
performance is one that is widely discussed, to date there 
has been no conclusive study conducted to determine the 
relative impact of steroids on batting performance versus 
pitching performance.  De Vany (2006) argues that steroids 
had no effect on offensive production in MLB.  His analysis 
shows that the distribution of home runs hit by the players 
is non-normal.  Curiously, he extrapolates from this that 
there is an infinite variance for the distribution of home 
runs hit by a player in a year.  Therefore, even though 
nearly every offensive statistical category has increased 
in the steroid era, he argues that “averages signify 
nothing” (DeVany, 2006, p.23).  Other researchers have 
established that “more players are hitting a higher number 
of home runs” (Yilmaz et al., 2001, p.181).  My analysis 
shows that offense significantly decreased the same year 
the policy was put in place.  
 
If steroids indeed had an effect on offensive 
production, the data will show an increase in a number of 
metrics.  While this may be evident in measuring the 
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increase of home runs, the anecdotal proxy of steroids’ 
impact, there are limitations to measuring this one 
statistic alone.  If batters were able to hit a baseball 
harder and further because of steroid use, home runs would 
be just one part of the offensive advantage gained over 
pitchers. Furthermore, previous literature cites runs, and 
not simply home runs, as increasing fan attendance 
(Winfree, et al., 2004, Domazlicky, 1990). Consequently, I 
have chosen runs rather than home runs as the critical 
statistic in gauging offensive output. 
 
Gabriel Schechter (2005, as cited in Seeman, 2005), a 
researcher for the National Baseball Hall of Fame, 
attributed the rise in offense to several factors, 
including the relatively small dimensions of modern fields. 
I therefore control for park effects in predicting offense. 
Others maintain that expansion is part of the cause of 
increased offense due to a change in the talent 
distribution (Bradbury, 2007).  However, expansion years 
prior to the 1990s seem to have no correlation with 
offensive production. 
 
There exists a widespread perception that the net 
effect of steroids has been positive for batting and 
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negative for pitching.  A recent poll conducted by USA 
Today found that only 18% of major league baseball players 
felt that steroids were not a contributor to record 
performances in recent years (Jenkins, 2005).  New York 
Times columnist Buzz Bissinger eloquently sums up the 
“greedy and feckless” owners’ role in the steroid mess as 
“guilty of cynically jettisoning the game’s subtlety and 
complexity to turn it into a slugfest circus” (Bissinger, 
2005).  Whether this is the case because more batters have 
used steroids, the product of usage is greater for batters, 
or some combination thereof is not the focus of this work.  
Likewise, a recent article in The Washington Post cites a 
number of baseball medical experts who take the position 
that the physiological benefit of steroids is far greater 
for batters than pitchers. “While drug experts largely 
agree that steroids can enhance any hitter's power and 
likely fueled the unprecedented home run surge in the 
1990s, the only evidence to suggest that steroids have 
significantly affected pitching during the same time period 
is the injuries that have occurred…Frank Jobe, the longtime 
Los Angeles Dodgers team physician credited with the 
invention of ligament replacement surgery (Tommy John 
surgery), speculated that steroids could earn a pitcher 
perhaps an extra 2 mph on his fastball” (Shipley, 2006, 
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p.E01).  However, even if it were the case that steroids 
had nothing to do with the rise in offense, there is still 
a perceived incentive for the owners if they believe such 
an increase to be so.  Further, although the literature on 
the effect of performance enhancing drugs is sparse due to 
their illegal nature, certain steroids have been shown to 
increase muscular strength by 5 to 20 percent (Hartgens and 
Kuipers 2004).   
 
MLB’s Steroid Policy 
On June 17, 1991 the MLB commissioner’s office put 
forth a memorandum acknowledging the harmful effects of 
steroids.  Also in the document, in the section entitled 
“Major League Baseball’s Drug Policy,” it is stated that 
players’ use of steroids “are subject to discipline by the 
Commissioner and risk permanent expulsion from the game” 
(Vincent, 1991, p.1).  No provision, however, was made 
concerning testing for steroids or any other banned 
substance for that matter.  The lack of any specific 
repercussions for a violation of the memorandum is 
tantamount to baseball’s non-policy, one that would last 
until the middle of the next decade.  Although the 2002 MLB 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) did address steroids, 
the player's union would, after public pressure, only allow 
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steroid testing on a trial basis for 2003 (Staudohar, 
2002).  It is easy to see why players would choose to use 
the steroids, especially under pre-policy conditions.  As 
Haugen (2004) shows, it is completely rational for players 
to cheat and use steroids when the perceived gains are high 
and the cost is low. 
 
During the 2003 season, provisional testing was 
conducted in order to gauge the level of usage in baseball.  
Only anonymous tests were conducted, and only for the 
garden-variety steroid—designer steroids like 
Tetrahydrogestrinone (THG) were undetectable by the type of 
test administered.  All players on the 40-man roster were 
tested in spring with an additional 240 players selected at 
random to undergo a second test.  If less than 2.5% of the 
tests had come back positive over consecutive seasons, all 
testing would have ceased under the 2002 CBA.  In practice, 
the usage rate was sufficiently high (between 5 and 7 
percent of the 1438 tests administered to major league 
players came back positive) to warrant future testing under 
the CBA.  This triggered further testing among MLB players 
for the 2004 season.  
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Each player was to be tested once over the course of 
the 2004 campaign.  A positive test would result in the 
player entering treatment, followed by a 15-day suspension 
or up to $10,000 fine for a second positive test, 
increasing to up to a year suspension or fine up to 
$100,000 for a fifth positive test. In 2005, the list of 
banned substances was expanded to include not only 
steroids, but steroid precursors, designer steroids, 
diuretics, and masking agents. Unannounced mandatory 
testing of each player was conducted over the course of the 
season.  There was further testing of randomly selected 
players as well as random testing during the off-season. 
The penalties established for an initial positive result 
was 10 days, increasing to 30 days, 60 days, and one year 
suspensions without pay for subsequent positive tests.  
Under the new policy in 2005, twelve players, including 
well-known players like Rafael Palmeiro, who testified in 
the 2005 Congressional hearings that he had never taken 
steroids, were suspended for ten games apiece for violating 
MLB's performance enhancing drug policy (Baseball Almanac, 
n.d.).  
 
Although steroids may have helped the economic 
viability of MLB, many including West Virginia Senator Jay 
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Rockefeller suggest this is harmful to society 
(Rockefeller, 2005).  The National Institute on Drug Abuse 
estimates that as of 2000, between 2.7% and 2.9% of young 
American adults had taken an anabolic-androgenic steroid at 
least once in their life.  In 2004, United States President 
George W. Bush stated the following in his State of the 
Union address:  
To help children make right choices, they need good 
examples. Athletics play such an important role in our 
society, but unfortunately, some in professional 
sports are not setting much of an example. The use of 
performance-enhancing drugs like steroids in baseball, 
football, and other sports is dangerous, and it sends 
the wrong message -- that there are shortcuts to 
accomplishment, and that performance is more important 
than character. So tonight I call on team owners, 
union representatives, coaches, and players to take 
the lead, to send the right signal, to get tough, and 
to get rid of steroids now.  
 
Presumably, the U.S. Congressional hearings took place in 
2005 for similar reasons.  However, I argue that the “team 
owners, union representatives, coaches, and players” 




Past studies have used attendance to estimate both 
short-run (Hill et al., 1982) and long-run demand (Schmidt 
and Berri, 2004) for MLB.  Attendance has also been 
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utilized to estimate player pay (Scully, 1974), the effects 
of roster turnover (Kahane and Shmanske, 1997), competitive 
balance (Schmidt and Berri, 2001), uncertainty of outcome 
(Knowles et al., 1992), and even the designated hitter 
(Domazlicky and Kerr, 1990).   
 
There is also a vast amount of literature focusing on 
how increased revenue affects player pay.  Scully (1974) 
showed that before MLB's reserve clause, players would earn 
roughly 10% of their marginal revenue product (MRP).  This 
implies that if a player can increase a team's revenue by a 
certain amount, the player would receive about 10% of this 
increase.  However, after the reserve clause, player pay 
increased dramatically.  Krautmann (1997) estimated that 
journeymen were actually paid more than 100% of their MRP, 
while Zimbalist (1992) found that they were only given 60% 
of their MRP.  Zimbalist also found that free agents were 
actually overpaid, while other Scully (1989) work shows 
that they are only paid about 28% of their MRP.  Fort 
(2006) demonstrates that from 2000-2004, players received 
an average of 61% of total revenue.  These studies 
illustrate that a percentage of any change in revenue will 
go to the players, while the rest will go to the owners and 
management. It follows that if steroids increase runs, and 
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therefore attendance, owners and players both would benefit 
financially from the increased fan interest. 
 
Model 
Using regression analysis it is possible to determine 
the relationship between attendance and offensive 
production, namely runs, controlling for factors known to 
affect attendance, such as win percentage, price, market 
size, and the impact of the player strikes.  Beyond these 
factors, I employ a trend variable to capture variability 
that could be attributable to aspects unrelated to offense.  
I then attempt to determine whether revenue was lost by 
team owners because of a decrease in offensive production.   
 
To test whether the use of steroids has an effect on 
attendance, a regression of average yearly attendance by 
team on an offense-based variable, Runs, and a set of 
control variables is employed.  The attendance data for MLB 
covers the period from 1992-2005.  The years were chosen to 
correspond to those following the commissioner’s 
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where Attendance is per game season attendance, by team, 
for each team that competed in the league in a particular 
season taken from baseballreference.com.  The log function 
was employed to calculate the percentage change in 
attendance.  Lagattendance is per game attendance in the 
previous year, by team, for each team that competed in MLB. 
Once again, the log function was utilized.  Win% is the 
team’s winning percentage at the end of the year.  The sign 
of this variable is expected to be positive because, simply 
put, fans want to see their home team win.  Aswin% is the 
team’s winning percentage at the all-star break, which is 
approximately half way through the season.  The sign of 
this variable is also expected to be positive.  The use of 
the Aswin% variable in addition to the Win% variable is 
important for the following reason.  Fans like to see their 
team win or at least contend for championships.  It is 
sometimes the case in MLB that a team makes a strong 
showing late in the season but never really contends for a 
championship.  Employing the Aswin% variable captures the 
effect of a team remaining in the hunt for a playoff berth.  
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Whitney (1988) had success using a similar design, in that 
case employing monthly winning percent variables and the 
number of games behind in the standings.  This 
specification helps capture the overall effect being in 
contention may have, but uses a less elaborate design 
because it was not the focus of this analysis.  All of the 
aforementioned variables were collected from baseball-
reference.com.  FCI is the fan cost index representing the 
real price (2005 dollars) of a family of four attending a 
game.  The fan cost index data were collected from 
teammarketing.com and includes four average-price tickets, 
four small soft drinks, two small beers, four hot dogs, two 
game programs, parking, and two adult-size caps.  The FCI 
is expected to be negative.  Pop is the 2003 estimate of 
city population (in millions) according to United States 
Census Bureau.  For Canadian cities, the 2001 Census of 
Population estimates are used.  According to fundamental 
economic principle, larger markets should, above and beyond 
other factors, draw larger crowds.  As such, the sign of 
this variable is anticipated to be positive.  Trend is a 
trend variable showing how attendance is changing over 
time.  A cursory glimpse at attendance data across all 
major American sports shows rising totals.  The Trend 
variable accounts for this development in baseball and is 
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expected to be positive.  Stad is an indicator variable 
equaling one if the team had a new stadium that year.  New 
facilities have been shown to increase attendance (Quirk 
and Fort, 1997). Therefore, Stad is predicted to be 
positive.  Strike94 and Strike95 are indicator variables 
for strike years.  Major League Baseball has a history of 
protracted labor disputes.  Empirical evidence shows that 
each of these incidents has had a demonstrative effect on 
short-term demand (Schmidt and Berri, 2002).  The dummy 
variables capture the variability that may stem from the 
strike independent of the other factors being measured.  
Accordingly, the Strike94 and Strike95 effects are 
anticipated to be negative.  2005season is also an 
indicator variable for the 2005 season, which may have 
benefited from the absence of National Hockey League (NHL) 
games being played.  The 2005-06 NHL lockout was the first 
time a major sports league lost an entire season due to a 
work stoppage and has been shown to affect other sports 
(Winfree, 2007).  While work stoppages do not typically 
have a statistically significant impact on other sports, 
Schmidt and Berri (2004) showed that the 1987 NFL strike 
indeed had a slight impact on MLB attendance.  
Consequently, the direction of this effect is expected to 
be positive.  Runs represents the average runs per game for 
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each team during each of the seasons examined and is the 
major variable of interest in the study.  The effect is 
anticipated to be positive.  Although Runs, Win%, and 
ASWin% are all highly correlated (   535.%, WinRuns , 
  446.%, ASWinRuns , and   871.%%, ASWinWin ), the more runs a 
team scores the more likely they are to win, I am not 
interested in the effect that Runs has through winning 
percentage.  Obviously, only one team can win a given game, 
therefore the average winning percentage for the league 
does not change year to year.  I am only interested in the 
effect that Runs has on attendance apart from winning 
percentage, so winning percentage is controlled for.  
However, because of the collinearity of these variables, 
three regressions are run—one without Win%, one without 
ASWin%, and the complete model.  This is done to check the 
consistency of the parameter estimate of  Runsln . 
 
The change in attendance associated with runs was then 
utilized to estimate the change in revenue experienced by 
owners during the 2005 season as a result of the new 
testing policy.  To do so I estimate decreased run 
production during the 2005 season that might be 
attributable to steroids.  I then used these data to gauge 
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what effect that drop off had on attendance based on actual 
2005 attendance figures.  Multiplying those figures by the 
fan cost index yields the revenue lost by the typical MLB 
owner. 
 
Next I use a second regression analysis to determine 
the portion of this loss attributable to steroids.  In 2005 
runs decreased by 4.6%, but this does not control for any 
new stadiums or trends.  Figure 2.1 also shows the dip in 
runs in 2005, however the drop off certainly does not stand 
out.  The data for the second regression date from 1992-
2005 to match the first regression.  The specification is 
as follows, 
 
     2005ln 484732210 stadiumtrendtrendruns  (2) 
 
where 2005 is an indicator variable that equals one for 
2005 when the steroid policy was put in place.  Stadium 
represents a matrix of forty-five indicator variables for 
each stadium to control for different offensive effects in 
different stadiums. 
 
Once the regressions are estimated, it is then 
possible to calculate the estimate of lost revenue due to 
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the decrease in offense.  If we assume that stadium revenue 
equals the product of attendance and the FCI, then the 
estimated loss in revenue can be calculated by the 
following equation: 
 
    1*
4
81
Re 1148   eeFCIvenue iXii    (3) 
 
Where X represents the data matrix in equation 1.  The left 
hand side of the equation is multiplied by 81/4 since each 
team plays 81 home games in a full season and the FCI is 
the price of a game for 4 people.  This equation 
illustrates the estimated stadium revenue for team i in 
2005 subtracted from the estimated stadium revenue that 
would have been brought in without a policy. 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics for the data are given in Table 
2.1.  The regression coefficients for both equation (1) and 
equation (2) were estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS).  All explanatory variables were entered into the 
model simultaneously.  Results from the regression 
estimating the effect of run production on attendance are 
given in Table 2.2.  Most variables—ln(Lagattendance) , 
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Win%, Aswin%, ln(Pop), Trend, Stad, Strike95, and 
2005season—are of the expected sign and statistically 
significant, with ln(FCI), Trend and Strike94 being 
exceptions.  The main variable of interest ln(Runs) was 
found to significantly increase attendance even after 
accounting for these other factors.  A 1% increase in runs 
generates a 0.15% increase in attendance with the complete 
model.  The other two demand regressions show a relatively 
consistent parameter estimate for  runsln .  Results from the 
regression measuring the change in runs after the enactment 
of the league’s anti-doping policy are shown in Table 2.3.  
These results show that runs were 6.8% below the expected 
run production without the steroid policy.  The 6.8% 
decline in runs scored during the 2005 season, due to the 
steroid policy, implies a 1.03% decrease in attendance.   
 
Table 2.4 shows what a 1.03% decrease in attendance 
means for each team in terms of revenue and fans per game.  
The average club drew 2,504,682 in 2005.  A 1.03% decrease 
represents 25,798 seats per year (318 per game) that went 
unoccupied because of the decrease in run production.  
Multiplying those numbers by the fan cost index, the league 
as a whole lost about $31.2 million in stadium revenue from 
the steroid policy.  It is also important to note that 
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regular season stadium revenue typically accounts for 
approximately half of all revenue for the team.  Therefore, 
if other revenues behave in a similar fashion, MLB may have 
lost over $60 million in 2005 due to the steroid policy, 
money that would have been shared by players and owners.  
This estimation is conservative given MLB’s own appraisal 
of the value of the 1998 home run record chase between Mark 
McGwire and Sammy Sosa.  Baseball estimated the financial 
windfall from the race to break the record at $1.5 billion 
(Jenkins, 2005).  In many ways McGwire has become a symbol 
of the steroid era, formerly Time magazine’s Hero of the 
Year, the ex-slugger’s damaging testimony during the 
Congressional hearings on steroids certainly played a part 
in his receiving less than one-third of the votes necessary 
to be inducted by the Baseball Writers’ Association of 
America into baseball’s Hall of Fame (Baseball Hall of 
Fame, 2007) despite sparkling credentials.  The league’s 
appraisal coupled with speculation on McGwire’s involvement 
with performance enhancing drugs further reinforces the 
financial disincentive to enact change in doping policy.  
 
Discussion 
This illustrates how changes in revenue from league 
policy can be estimated.  Just as in the case of revenue 
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sharing, luxury tax, and salary cap policies, I argue that 
is also important to look at league and team revenues 
regarding the steroid policy.  The regression estimates 
indicate that attendance at MLB games was strongly 
influenced by the increased offensive production 
experienced during the 1990s and the first half of the 
current decade.  Some other possible explanations for the 
recent decrease in offense in MLB have been accounted for 
in the methods.  Although the point of this research is not 
to prove that steroids have increased offense, only that 
the perception of their use was ignored, the statistics 
seem to confirm that any perceived increase in offense from 
steroid use may be correct.  Furthermore, it is unlikely 
that other exogenous factors decreased offense in 2005 
given that expected error term in the model is zero for 
2005.  It also stands to reason that if any other changes 
coincided with the policy change, baseball officials would 
have implemented ones to counterbalance the expected 
decrease in runs.  As such, these estimates may, in fact, 
be underestimates of the true value given reports of MLB’s 
use of means to increase offense such as the use of more 
tightly wound baseballs in 2005, widely believed to benefit 
hitters (Ocker, 2006).  These findings might help 
illustrate why both the player’s association and owners 
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were unwilling to change their steroid policy until 
Congress stepped in.  MLB may have been gaining over $31 
million a year in stadium revenue alone by not controlling 
steroid use among the players.  
 
The results of this research imply that there are many 
other questions regarding MLB’s steroid policy.  Future 
research might examine how much of this extra revenue went 
to players and how much went to management or owners.  
Additionally, as performance enhancing drugs continue to be 
an issue in other sports like cycling, track and field, 
horse racing, and football, research gauging the impact of 
enforcement in these sports too is critical.  
Representative Tom Davis underscores the importance of 
vigilant testing beyond the fundamental objective of a 
level playing field.  “We need to understand the dangerous 
cycle that perception creates.  College athletes believe 
they have to consider steroids if they’re going to make the 
pros; high school athletes, in turn, think steroids are the 
key to getting a scholarship” (Davis in Jenkins, 2005).  
This dangerous cycle created by the mere perception of 
performance enhancing drugs’ prevalence in sports is no 
less applicable to other sports and in other countries.  It 
is also worth looking further into whether college and high 
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school athletes are truly influenced by the perception of 
performance enhancing drug use in professional sports.  It 
would seem as though future research is warranted in this 
area as performance enhancing drug use continues to be an 




Descriptive Statistics for Steroid Study 
 
Parameter N Min Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Attendance 401 7935 57570 28657 9210 
Lagattendance 401 7935 57570 28570 9246 
Win% 401 0.265 0.716 0.501 0.073 
Aswin% 401 0.272 0.753 0.501 0.077 
Fci 401 83.6 276.2 140.9 28.0 
Pop 401 0.317 8.086 1.481 2.008 
Trend 401 1 14 7.666 4.000 
Stad 401 0 1 0.035 0.184 
Strike94 401 0 1 0.070 0.255 
Strike95 401 0 1 0.070 0.255 
2005season 401 0 1 0.072 0.259 







Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results 
Estimating Log of Attendance per Game (Yearly Data) for MLB 
 
 












Constant 1.366*** 5.707 <0.001 1.394*** 5.741 <0.001 1.274*** 5.349 <0.001 
Ln(lagattendance) 0.784*** 33.184 <0.001 0.787*** 32.814 <0.001 0.788*** 33.210 <0.001 
Win% 0.497** 2.539 0.011 1.077*** 9.585 <0.001    
Aswin% 0.612*** 3.591 <0.001    0.968*** 9.987 <0.001 
Ln(fci) 0.017 0.314 0.754 0.014 0.245 0.806 0.023 0.416 0.677 
Ln(pop) 0.015** 2.029 0.042 0.014* 1.875 0.061 0.017** 2.224 0.026 
Trend -0.004 -1.483 0.138 -0.003 -1.410 0.159 -0.004* -1.718 0.086 
Stad 0.284*** 7.937 <0.001 0.286*** 7.875 <0.001 0.281*** 7.793 <0.001 
Strike94 -0.023 -0.841 0.400 -0.023 -0.819 0.413 -0.028 -0.999 0.318 
Strike95 -0.253*** -9.329 <0.001 -0.254*** -9.205 <0.001 -0.256*** -9.379 <0.001 
2005season 0.029 1.021 0.307 0.026 0.904 0.366 0.034 1.192 0.233 
Ln(runs) 0.151** 2.100 0.036 0.137* 1.877 0.060 0.212*** 3.113 0.002 
R2 .863   .859   .861   
N 401   401   401   
 
* significant at p < .10 
** significant at p < .05 
*** significant at p < .01 
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Table 2.3 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results  
Estimating Log of Runs per Game (Yearly Data) for MLB 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Parameter   Parameter Estimate  t-statistic  p-value 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Constant   1.436    52.886***  <0.001 
Trend    0.005    3.268***    0.001 
AnaStadium   0.081    2.245**    0.025 
BankOneBP   0.075    1.645     0.101 
AtlFCStadium   0.072    1.470     0.142 
TurnerField   0.116    2.899***    0.004 
OriolePark   0.108    3.077***    0.002 
FenwayPark   0.165    4.669***  <0.001 
Wrigley   0.045    1.271     0.205 
NewComiskey  0.163    4.611***  <0.001 
RiverfrontStadium  0.079    2.106**    0.036 
GreatAmBP   0.058    0.962     0.337 
CleMemStadium  0.062    0.879     0.380 
JacobsField   0.214    5.817***  <0.001 
MileHigh   0.139    1.437     0.152 
CoorsField   0.206    5.473***  <0.001 
TigersStadium   0.133    3.213***    0.001 
ComericaPark   -0.011    -0.245     0.807 
ProPlryStadium  0.011    0.299     0.765 
Astrodome   0.108    2.604***    0.010 
MinuteMdPark  0.118    2.572**    0.011 
Kauffman   0.059    1.685*     0.093 
MilFCStadium  0.094    2.340**    0.020 
MillerPark   -0.034    -0.698     0.486 
Metrodome   0.083    2.348**    0.019 
OlympicStadium  0.001    0.028     0.978 
SheaStadium   0.013    0.373     0.710 
YankeeStadium  0.215    6.102***  <0.001 
OaklandCol   0.140    3.973***  <0.001 
VeteransStadium  0.041    1.104     0.270 
CitizensBkPark  0.156    2.194**    0.029 
3RiversStadium  0.031    0.775     0.439 
PNCPark   -0.042    -0.849     0.396 
JackMurphyStadium  0.019    0.505     0.614 
PetcoPark   0.032    0.443     0.658 
CandlestickPark  0.080    1.918*     0.056 
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SBCPark   0.104    2.263**    0.024 
Kingdome   0.189    4.350***  <0.001 
SafecoField   0.129    2.980***    0.003 
BuschStadium   0.095    2.687***    0.008 
TropicanaField  0.012    0.267     0.789 
OldArlington   0.095    1.342     0.180 
BPatArlington   0.203    5.538***  <0.001 
Skydome   0.117    3.307***    0.001 
2005Season   -0.068    -3.264***    0.001 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
R2 = 0.389 
 
N = 401 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
*     Significant at p < 0.10 
**   Significant at p < 0.05 





Estimated Change in Attendance and Gate Revenue from 













ANAHEIM ANGELS 431 $125.78 $1,098,767 
ARIZONA DIAMONDBACKS 307 $145.97 $906,094 
ATLANTA BRAVES 320 $145.55 $943,577 
BALTIMORE ORIOLES 339 $158.62 $1,089,275 
BOSTON REDSOX 389 $276.24 $2,173,788 
CHICAGO CUBS 380 $210.01 $1,615,617 
CHICAGO WHITE SOX 311 $188.07 $1,186,295 
CINCINNATTI REDS 268 $145.10 $786,092 
CLEVELAND INDIANS 259 $156.18 $817,598 
COLORADO ROCKIES 264 $141.68 $756,112 
DETROIT TIGERS 247 $157.93 $789,303 
FLORIDA MARLINS 240 $147.04 $713,959 
HOUSTON ASTROS 382 $182.64 $1,413,015 
KANSAS CITY ROYALS 191 $119.85 $463,909 
LOS ANGELES DODGERS 389 $158.98 $1,250,832 
MILWAUKEE BREWERS 263 $130.96 $697,059 
MINNESOTA TWINS 257 $146.49 $762,857 
NEW TORK METS 310 $185.13 $1,163,410 
NEW YORK YANKEES 503 $193.86 $1,974,010 
OAKLAND ATHLETICS 289 $152.64 $893,417 
PHILADELPHIA PHILLIES 408 $189.31 $1,564,134 
PITTSBURGH PIRATES 210 $143.31 $608,912 
SAN DIEGO PADRES 374 $176.32 $1,335,172 
SAN FRANCISCO GIANTS 355 $191.37 $1,376,966 
SEATTLE MARINERS 328 $172.03 $1,143,017 
ST. LOUIS CARDINALS 422 $177.66 $1,517,542 
TAMPA BAY DEVIL RAYS 159 $143.81 $463,187 
TEXAS RANGERS 335 $136.14 $922,946 
TORONTO BLUE JAYS 253 $164.53 $842,741 
Total   $31,269,603
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Discrimination and Demand: The Effect of International 




Thirty-three years after Roberto Clemente, MLB’s first 
foreign-born superstar, was inducted into the Hall of Fame, 
most pundits favored the United States or one of the Latin 
powerhouses, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, or Venezuela, 
to win the inaugural 2006 World Baseball Classic (WBC). It 
was an Asian team, Japan, however, that emerged victorious. 
This makes two points clear—the proficiency of Hispanic 
players is well-accepted and America’s national pastime has 
gone global.  As Figure 3.1 shows, over the last 20 years, 
there has been a substantial rise in the percentage of 
international players in MLB.  As of 1985, just over ten 
percent of MLB players were born outside of the United 
States.  In 2005, over one-fourth of players were foreign 
born.  Experts have no choice but to recognize the 
international presence in American professional sports and 
even the need for sports to orient themselves toward a 
global fan base (Liefer, 1995).  Even so, while there has 
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been a wealth of research on racial discrimination in 
professional sports, the influence of nationality has yet 
to be studied to the degree of race or gender in spite of 
the fact that foreign participation in MLB is 
chronologically deep and geographically wide (Osborne, 
2006).  This study attempts to take one step towards 
measuring the impact of foreign players on demand for 
professional baseball in the United States.  Specifically, 
it measures how the presence of international players 
affects attendance.  Further, I evaluate the source of 
consumer discrimination being expressed. 
 
MLB is different from some sports leagues in that it 
does not seem to discourage international players.  Major 
League Soccer (MLS) has a quota on foreign players, 
apparently to promote the development and recognition of 
American talent.  As of 2006, the Canadian Football League 
required that at least half of the players be Canadian.  
European football (soccer) leagues also have tried to limit 
the number of international players.  For example, in 1991, 
the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) limited 
teams to playing three international players plus two other 
international players with domestic playing experience for 
select games.  Similar league policies have caused problems 
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recently because of the European Union’s law on the free 
movement of labor (Leeds and Von Allmen, 2007).  Presumably 
these league policies are put in place to increase the 
visibility of domestic players at risk of becoming a 
minority.  This, however, is not the case in MLB, as I will 
point out that in our data sample there are few teams 
fielding a majority of foreign players. 
 
To begin with, the initial purchasing of playing 
talent in MLB varies based on a player’s background.  
Players born in the US or Canada first enter the league via 
a first-year-player draft.  Those completing high school or 
their junior or senior season at a four-year college are 
draft-eligible.  Residents of US territories and players 
competing in high school baseball in the US also enter the 
league through the draft.  Teams select in a modified 
reverse order of finish from the previous season whereby 
the team with the fewest wins from the American and 
National leagues respectively alternate selecting first.  
By contrast, MLB does not have any specific provisions 
regulating the signing of foreign-born players.  
Consequently, international players are free agents until 
they choose to sign traditional or developmental contracts 
with MLB teams.  There are no restrictions on the number of 
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foreign-born players signed by an organization or the 
number competing for the major league club.  This chapter 
raises the question whether MLB’s policy with respect to 
foreign-born players is a boon to league finances or, 
alternatively, whether policies implemented by other 
leagues would translate into greater revenues. 
 
Relevant Literature 
Becker (1971) contended that discrimination originates 
from three potential sources—employer, coworker, and 
customer preferences.  Since customer preferences cannot be 
modified by market forces, teams attuned to their fan 
base’s preferences stand to benefit financially.  This is 
particularly important as, although player productivity is 
stochastic (Krautmann, 1990), consumer preferences for 
certain types of players can be ascertained and both play a 
role in a player’s marginal contribution to revenue.  
Accordingly, when management employs race-neutral hiring 
practices with respect to players, they may do so at the 
expense of profits.  Burdekin’s (1991 and 2005) articles 
applied Becker to National Basketball Association (NBA) 
fans and showed that the racial composition of teams and 
their metropolitan markets to be positively correlated.  
Subsequent research (Hoang and Rascher, 1999) found that 
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matching team racial composition with the population of the 
team’s market area increases attendance, although McCormick 
and Tollison (2001) using data from the 1980s found no such 
relationship. 
 
Customer prejudice in baseball was first examined in 
the 1970s.  Over the years, the impact of race on 
attendance has been studied extensively, though the results 
are ambiguous.  Gwartney and Haworth (1974) studied the 
decade immediately following integration and saw that 
African-American players increased home attendance.  They 
showed that the inclusion of black players on a club 
increased team quality, measured by games won, and also 
brought additional customers to the park independent of 
winning.  It is worth noting that later research showed a 
statistically significant relationship between winning and 
the presence of black players in the starting lineup in the 
early 1950s (Hanssen, 1998).  By the 1960s, evidence showed 
the impact of African Americans on attendance had 
diminished (Scully, 1973).  Examining data from the 1970s, 
there was no evidence that racial composition had any 
impact on revenues among the first free agent cohort 
(Sommers and Quinton, 1982).  While the aforementioned 
articles look at customer discrimination as it relates to 
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revenues, other studies introduce alternative sources of 
discrimination.  Bodvarsson and Brastow (1999) argue that 
employer discrimination was at the source, and 
discriminatory practices were reduced when monopsonistic 
power diminished in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the 
NBA. 
 
Still other studies examine the relationship between 
race and wage disparity.  Kahn (1991) determined that the 
wage gap between black and white basketball players favored 
whites by 11 to 25 percent.  Referring back to Becker, no 
entry effect was found to be present (Brown, Spiro, and 
Keenan, 1991; Kahn and Sherer, 1988), although wage 
differential was shown to be significant.  Kahn (1991) 
asserted that much turnover (exit) in sports is involuntary 
given the high incomes earned by professional athletes.  
Scully (1973) suggested that African-Americans faced 
retention barriers in MLB.  Similarly, Jibou (1988) found 
that black baseball players had higher exit rates than 
whites between 1971 and 1985 and Johnson and Marple (1973) 
found that white reserve players had longer careers than 
black benchwarmers.  Bodvarsson and Partridge (1999) add 
coworker discrimination as a potential source of variance 
in salary among divergent groups.  Longley (1995 and 2000) 
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showed French Canadians playing hockey in English Canada 
suffered from salary discrimination and were 
underrepresented on English Canadian teams relative to US-
based teams. 
 
Similarly, country-of-origin has emerged as an 
important input effect on consumer behavior.  Early 
scholarship on the subject demonstrated that consumers use 
country-of-origin information to evaluate products (Han, 
1989; Hong and Wyer, 1989; Johansson, 1989).  Experts and 
novices both utilize country-of-origin information in 
evaluations when attribute information is ambiguous 
(Maheswaran, 1994).  Applied to sports, Osborne (2006) 
tested whether there has been sustained specialization 
among players from a given foreign country and found 
Canada’s trend to produce pitching and that of Puerto Rico 
and Venezuela to produce offense.  Pedace’s (2007) paper on 
English Professional Soccer uses a market test approach to 
evaluate for the presence of nationality discrimination by 
estimating the effect of team nationality composition on 
attendance.  He finds owners may benefit from increased 
attendance with more South American players.  No similar 
studies, however, have been undertaken to assess the 




These studies have a direct and important application 
in the world of sports.  With the wealth of information 
freely available it is possible to gauge if there is 
customer discrimination vis-à-vis international players as 
well as identifying the source of this bias.  I test the 
following two hypotheses.  One, the presence of 
international players will have an impact on attendance in 
MLB beyond their contribution to winning.  The conclusions 
to draw with respect to this part of the study are fairly 
straightforward.  If demand decreased when foreign players 
competed for a team, we can conclude that there is customer 
discrimination against players born outside the United 
States.  If demand increased we can infer that baseball 
fans prefer to watch foreign-born players.  If there is no 
positive or negative effect we can say that baseball fans 
are indifferent to whether players are born in or outside 
of the United States. 
 
It is important to note that I focus on consumer 
discrimination as opposed to employer discrimination.  
Other studies have found evidence of employer 
discrimination in MLB soon after MLB became racially 
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integrated (Lanning, 2007).  However, using this data set, 
I find no evidence that the number of foreign players 
affects a team’s winning percentage.  This gives some 
indication that owners are not biased for or against 
international players in their hiring practices. 
 
The second hypothesis is that markets with higher 
(lower) portions of their populations identifying with 
foreign demographics will attend in greater force if the 
team fielded in the corresponding market is similarly high 
(low).  I postulate that individuals identifying themselves 
as belonging to a non-American nationality on the US Census 
prefer to watch players born in their country.  I therefore 
predict that the cumulative effect of matching the 
proportion of an MSA’s population from each non-American 
country to the proportion of players from those countries 
will increase demand for MLB teams. 
 
Data and Empirical Specification 
I chose to study the years 1985-2005, utilizing 
Structured Query Language (SQL) and the database available 
at baseball1.com to find player information.  Using SQL I 
identified all the players who competed in the major 
leagues as well as their country-of-origin.  Total counts 
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were tabulated of the number of players from each country 
who competed for each team and each season.  Canadian teams 
(Toronto Blue Jays and Montreal Expos) were omitted from 
the study because the application of who is an 
international player is inconsistent from country to 
country.   
 




























The variables entered in the model are as follows.  
Attendance represents a team’s average game attendance in 
year t for team i.  The quality and pricing control factors 
included Win%, Lagwin%, Stadium, Stadium5, Population, 
Ticketprice, TeamsinMSA, Income, and Trend.  Win% 
corresponds to the winning percentage of the team during 
that season and was obtained from baseball-reference.com.  
Lagwin% is the winning percentage of the team during the 
previous season.  This variable is utilized to control for 
fan expectations early in the season, but may also pick up 
any habitual nature of fans (Lee and Smith, forthcoming).  
Stadium and Stadium5 are inserted in the model to control 
for the increased demand attributable to the novelty effect 
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of new stadiums.  There is no accepted convention in the 
sport literature as far as controlling for the duration of 
this novelty effect.  Quirk and Fort found a significant 
effect using the first five years of a stadium’s existence 
(Quirk and Fort, 1992), thus I have chosen to use five 
years in this model.  Stadium is an indicator variable for 
whether a team’s home stadium was in its first year of use 
and Stadium5 an indicator variable for whether a team’s 
home stadium was five or fewer years old.  Population 
corresponds to the value of the franchise’s MSA population.  
US Census Bureau data is used to record the population for 
all MSAs where MLB teams are located.  Data were recorded 
for each MSA’s 1980, 1990, and 2000 population using 
American Factfinder.  Intervening years were interpolated 
assuming a constant growth rate.  Years after 2000 were 
extrapolated using the 1990-2000 growth rate identified for 
each respective franchise in the previous equation.  These 
decadal census figures are the most reliable population 
data available.  In reviewing the differences between the 
growth rates for each respective population and market 
population in the 1980s and 1990s (the absolute value of 
the 1980s growth rate minus the 1990s growth rate), 97% of 
the figures were within 10% of one another.  Consequently, 
it is fair to conclude that any population movements that 
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may have occurred during this period happened steadily 
rather than rapidly and are accurately represented in the 
interpolations.  These figures are available in Table 3.2.  
Ticketprice is the price of tickets for the team deflated 
by the Consumer Price Index (2005 dollars).  Ticketprice 
was retrieved from teammarketing.com.  Although baseball 
tickets are considered normal goods, the price of tickets 
has been shown to sometimes be set in the inelastic range, 
thus we do not necessarily want to interpret this effect 
(Krautmann and Berri, 2007).  Consequently, I run two 
versions of the model—one with the price term, the other 
without—and allow the reader to interpret one or both of 
the results.  TeamsinMSA refers to the number of additional 
teams sharing a given team’s market.  As MLB teams have 
been shown to be substitutes for one another (Winfree, 
McCluskey, Mittelhammer, and Fort, 2004), the influence of 
close substitutes on demand is expected to be negative.  
Income is the mean income for residents of a franchise’s 
MSA.  Logs are taken of Attendance, Population, 
Ticketprice, and Income because these variables are 
strictly positive and do not already represent a 
percentage.  Trend is a variable increasing by one unit for 
each season to account for changes over time.   
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The variables of interest are Foreignplayers, 
Foreginplayers*trend, Foreignplayers*trend2, and Matching.  
Foreignplayers represents the number of foreign players on 
the team.  International players comprised an average of 
18.8% of league rosters from 1985-2005.  The 2004 Los 
Angeles Dodgers led all teams in the study with 23 foreign-
born players, constituting 53.5% of their roster.  
Interestingly, twice during the 1985-2005 seasons a 
franchise did not employ even one foreign-born player—the 
1985 Chicago Cubs and the 1992 Detroit Tigers—while the 
single greatest representation of any one nationality came 
in 2004, when the Kansas City Royals employed 10 players 
born in the Dominican Republic.  Foreignplayers is 
interacted with trend and trend2 to measure the linear and 
quadratic pattern of the effect over the whole era.  The 
interaction is measured since we anticipate the marginal 
impact may have changed over this 20 year period.   
 
Matching was calculated by a simple aggregation of the 
product of the proportion of each team from a given country 
and the proportion of the corresponding MSA population.  
The equation is defined as:  








where P is the proportion of players, X is the proportion 
of the population, and N is the number of nationalities.  A 
value was calculated for each team in each season.  
Descriptive statistics for the data are provided in 3.1.  
Effects of players from specific countries on demand were 
also investigated.  However, no meaningful results were 
found.  In addition to the matching of market population 
and team composition, I also looked into whether there was 
discrimination against Asian or Hispanic populations (the 
two primary non-American player populations) without regard 
to a specific country.  Here too no significance was found. 
 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression was run to 
estimate the equation to correct for any autocorrelation or 
heteroskedasticity.  Also, given the nature of the data, it 
is reasonable to expect correlated error terms within 
teams.  As such, a robust covariance matrix with clustered 
standard errors was used.2 
 
Finally, I quantified the value of an adding one 
foreign-born player during each season in our study.  The 
                     
2 All standard errors were clustered by team to help correct for any correlation pattern within teams over 
time (Bertrand et al. 2004).  The covariance matrix is given by 


































iiii  where X is nxk, there are G teams, and i 
denotes the observations for one team.   
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percent change in attendance attributable to the addition 
of one foreign-born player was evaluated by the equation:  
 
2
121110 ** trendtrendAttendance        (3) 
 
The change in revenue was then estimated using the formula: 
 
81***Re tt eTicketpricAttendanceAttendancevenue      (4) 
 
where ΔAttendance is the estimation from the previous 
equation, tAttendance  is the average attendance throughout 
baseball in a given season, and teTicketpric  is the average 
ticket price in that season deflated by the Consumer Price 
Index.  The equation is multiplied by 81, since MLB teams 
play 81 home games during the season.  Therefore the change 
in revenue represents the yearly change in ticket revenue 
for a team. 
 
Results 
The regression results are displayed in Table 3.3 both 
with and without ticket price and the interaction of 
foreign players and trend in the model.  All four models 
showed statistically significant heteroskedasticity and 
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first-order autocorrelation, which was corrected for by 
using GLS.  The ensuing interpretation discusses the 
complete model.  The majority of the control variables are 
in the expected direction and significant in the model.  
Winning percentage, the previous season’s winning 
percentage, first year in a new stadium, and MSA population 
were all positive and significant.  The number of teams in 
MSA significantly reduced demand.  Income and whether or 
not a team was in its first five years in a new stadium 
were not found to be significant. 
 
Turning our attention to the variables of interest, 
all were found to be significant in estimating attendance 
in the full model with the exception of the matching 
variable.  Considered alone, the number of foreign players 
on a team increased demand, but along with the interaction 
terms, the effect is more intricate and quite clearly 
quadratic.  Figure 3.2 depicts the combined effect of the 
number of foreign players and interaction terms.  The 
overall result of these terms, taken in combination, shows 
that foreign players had a negative effect on demand at the 
outset of the period being studied.  Although the effect 
continues to remain negative for almost half the era, it is 
moving steadily in a positive direction, approaching zero 
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in 1993.  The marginal change from season to season 
continues to move in a positive direction and at roughly 
similar intervals, peaking around the year 2001, in which 
attendance increased 1.14% from the presence of an 
international player.  Then, although the net effect 
remains positive until the end of the sample period, it 
flattens out.  In checking for whether the interaction 
effects were merely picking up on a quadratic trend effect, 
trend squared was introduced into the model but was not 
found to be significant.  It is therefore fair to conclude 
that the foreign players interaction is a significant 
finding. 
 
Table 3.4 shows the percentage change attributable to 
adding one foreign player to a team for each season in the 
study as well as the change in ticket revenue associated 
with such an addition.  The revenue associated with that 
change was calculated based on the average attendance 
across the league and ticket price for each season.  The 
largest negative change in revenue from an international 
player came in 1985 with a loss of $735,528.  In 2001, when 
the effect peaked, teams gained $568,068 from the presence 
of an international player. 
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I also ran estimations using year indicator variables, 
instead of quadratic trend variables, to validate that the 
findings truly followed a quadratic pattern and were not 
simply a function of outliers in just a few seasons.  
Figure 3.2 also depicts the individual year effects along 
with the estimated quadratic effect. 
 
While not significant, the findings on the matching 
variable are no less interesting.  Were it the case that 
the matching variable was found to be significant, we could 
have attributed the increase in attendance associated with 
international players to the fan population identifying 
with those countries.  However, since the likeness of team 
and fan population is not significant in the model, the 
change in demand attributable to foreign-born players 
cannot be found in the non-international fan population.  
Rather than ascribing the change in demand to fans who want 
to see their countrymen compete in MLB, there is no 
evidence that the increase (decrease) in demand is 
different in the international and non-international 
populations. 
 
In light of the findings with respect to the matching 
variable coupled with the declining presence of African-
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American players in MLB, as documented by the Racial and 
Gender Report Card (RGRC) (Lapchick, 2007), I believed that 
identifying whether MSAs with higher or lower African-
American populations responded differently to the presence 
of foreign-born players may shed more light on the source 
of the consumer bias.  I looked at whether MSAs with higher 
proportions of African-Americans responded differently to 
foreign players, but did not find any such effect. 
 
I further queried the same database to see if there 
were any confounding factors that may be the true source of 
the change in demand attributable to foreign players and 
cite several in the ensuing discussion.  The number of 
foreign pitchers and batters each increase incrementally 
throughout the sample.  As such neither explains the 
quadratic pattern of demand.  I further conjectured that 
the type of foreign batter in the major leagues may have 
evolved to the slugger favored by MLB fans, only to decline 
in recent seasons, but, in fact, the highest ratio of home 
runs per foreign batter occurred during the recent 
flattening out, several years after the peak in demand for 
foreign-born players.  Finally, the proportion of batters 
among foreign players declined gradually and so too does 
not confound the change in preference for foreign players.  
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All of these analyses support the idea that there is not a 
confounding factor in the evolution of fan interest in 




This chapter demonstrates how traditional studies of 
consumer discrimination can be applied to gauge the impact 
of international players in sports.  I show that the net 
effect of adding an additional international player has 
evolved during the sample period from a negative to a 
positive.  Furthermore, I demonstrate that the marginal 
effect from year to year, steadily increasing throughout 
the first fifteen seasons in the study, recently has begun 
to level off.  Just as in the case of post-integration MLB, 
as the population of athletes continues to grow 
internationally heterogeneous, this line of study takes on 
added importance to owners, management, and policy-makers 
in all leagues.   
 
The results would imply that leagues may have 
incentives to make their league more international.  The 
findings are not merely statistically but economically 
significant.  At its peak in 2001, the effect of adding an 
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additional foreign-born player to a major league roster was 
an increase in over $568,000 in revenue and the average US-
based team fielded 10.78 foreign players on its roster.  
Thus, the additional revenue garnered by the average team 
was over $6.1 million in that season alone.  Furthermore, 
since teams fielded as many as 14 and as few as 7 foreign 
players that same season, the difference in revenues 
between these two teams is almost $4 million.  
Consequently, franchises identifying the effect stood to 
gain a considerable advantage in revenues on competing 
teams in the league.  Leagues such as the National Football 
League and the National Basketball Association have 
actively tried to become more international by getting 
international players or scheduling more games outside of 
the United States.  While this study may not have 
implications for trying to create a more international fan 
base, it does show that domestic demand may be affected by 
the presence of international players.  Future studies may 
explore if similar trends exist in other sports and explain 





 Table 3.1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Foreign Players Study 
 
Parameter N Min Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Ln(Attendance) 546 8.998 10.961 10.179 0.333 
Win% 546 0.265 0.716 0.500 0.071 
Lagwin% 546 0.265 0.716 0.499 0.070 
Stadium 546 0 1 0.035 0.183 
Stadium5 546 0 1 0.163 0.370 
Ln(Population) 546 14.181 16.949 15.355 0.727 
Ln(Ticketprice) 546 2.127 3.797 2.680 0.309 
Teamsin MSA 546 0 1 0.310 0.463 
Ln(Income) 546 10.256 10.756 10.481 0.115 
Trend 546 0 20 10.381 6.049 
Foreignplayers 546 0 23 8.103 3.962 
Matching 546 0.000 0.240 0.073 0.047 

























chgAtl 0.402 8.550 1.521 11.677 0.022 4.401 8.407 6.572 4.440 
chgBal 0.016 1.667 2.783 2.010 0.014 1.864 3.052 3.097 4.743 
chgBos 0.821 4.031 3.614 1.667 0.000 6.502 5.388 2.937 8.786 
chgCha 0.000 1.453 1.211 1.231 0.008 0.833 2.593 0.853 3.508 
chgChn 0.000 1.453 1.211 1.231 0.008 0.833 2.593 0.853 3.508 
chgCin 0.939 8.170 0.657 12.657 9.934 3.088 4.114 2.791 5.989 
chgCle 3.156 2.684 5.181 1.100 0.178 3.119 8.400 2.594 5.169 
chgDet 0.885 4.545 1.560 4.871 0.161 0.653 7.867 0.662 4.757 
chgHou 0.154 0.080 5.666 0.534 0.019 3.675 2.033 4.281 2.714 
chgKca 0.405 3.948 3.898 3.924 0.931 1.827 2.609 2.376 5.679 
chgLaa 5.669 5.180 5.705 5.633 0.003 8.936 5.511 9.599 9.468 
chgLan 5.669 5.180 5.705 5.633 0.003 8.936 5.511 9.599 9.468 
chgMil 0.910 1.671 0.930 1.015 0.094 3.401 1.056 2.746 6.081 
chgMin 0.015 6.989 1.580 7.180 1.185 4.191 4.045 0.763 6.796 
chgNya 5.486 2.523 2.609 0.838 0.000 6.222 7.686 4.503 11.667 
chgNyn 5.486 2.523 2.609 0.838 0.000 6.222 7.686 4.503 11.667 
chgOak 5.570 6.504 5.559 8.814 0.051 7.022 8.392 5.270 10.814 
chgPhi 1.782 1.266 3.245 7.761 0.007 4.584 5.480 5.335 7.291 
chgPit 0.599 4.756 2.200 4.054 0.070 2.097 2.118 0.568 0.630 
chgSdn 1.785 1.942 5.076 2.865 0.037 4.972 3.719 4.337 4.704 
chgSea 1.419 1.716 7.050 2.123 0.287 3.512 3.732 0.983 9.253 
chgSfn 5.570 6.504 5.559 8.814 0.051 7.022 8.392 5.270 10.814 
chgStl 0.269 3.543 1.130 4.458 0.695 0.305 6.071 1.146 1.964 







Generalized Least Squares Results 
 
Estimating Log of Season Attendance in MLB 
 
Variable Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Constant 
6.7351** 2.18 6.4735** 2.03 5.1006* 1.85 4.7426* 1.67 
Win% 
1.3408*** 6.22 1.3414*** 6.11 1.4378*** 6.54 1.4440*** 6.42 
Lagwin% 
0.8894*** 5.98 0.9425*** 6.58 1.0547*** 7.23 1.1171*** 8.40 
Stadium 
0.1974*** 4.55 0.1947*** 4.39 0.2240*** 5.75 0.2225*** 5.68 
Stadium5 
0.0640 0.93 0.0618 0.86 0.0896 1.42 0.0901 1.36 
Ln(Population) 
0.1758*** 2.88 0.1832*** 2.96 0.2185*** 3.93 0.2280*** 3.98 
Ln(Ticketprice) 
0.2616* 1.75 0.2695* 1.80         
Teamsin MSA 
-0.1803* -1.76 -0.1935* -1.78 -0.2473*** -2.47 -0.2642*** -2.46 
Ln(Income) 
-0.0837 -0.28 -0.0861 -0.29 0.0551 0.21 0.0607 0.23 
Trend 
-0.0196*** -2.66 -0.0083 -1.44 -0.0116* -1.74 -0.0009 -0.19 
Foreignplayers 
-0.0368* -1.80 0.0057 1.11 -0.0376* -1.87 0.0093** 2.16 
Foreignplayers*Trend 
0.0061** 2.25 
    
0.0075*** 2.68     
Foreignplayers*Trend2 
-0.0002** -2.27 
    
-0.0003*** -2.90 
    
Matching 
0.1920 0.33 0.0697 0.13 0.1416 0.25 0.0253 0.05 
                  








































Foreign Batters and Pitchers with Batter Power Production 
 
Year HR #Batters HR/Batter #Pitchers PctForeignBatters PctForeignPitcher
1985 385 111 3.468 33 11.20% 7.57%
1986 390 110 3.545 33 10.88% 7.35%
1987 574 123 4.667 38 11.82% 8.15%
1988 446 138 3.232 48 13.42% 10.50%
1989 417 128 3.258 40 12.05% 8.20%
1990 485 141 3.440 49 12.78% 9.46%
1991 591 156 3.788 58 14.51% 11.74%
1992 462 151 3.060 49 14.34% 10.52%
1993 654 178 3.674 64 15.19% 11.59%
1994 670 163 4.110 65 15.87% 13.24%
1995 777 199 3.905 83 16.14% 13.63%
1996 995 216 4.606 86 17.52% 14.73%
1997 996 247 4.032 104 20.46% 18.06%
1998 1186 256 4.633 107 19.69% 17.54%
1999 1396 277 5.040 121 21.66% 19.24%
2000 1420 293 4.846 132 21.77% 19.97%
2001 1521 308 4.938 131 23.51% 20.44%
2002 1410 317 4.448 146 24.63% 22.60%
2003 1648 323 5.102 148 24.53% 22.39%
2004 1812 342 5.298 165 26.09% 24.81%
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Uncertainty of outcome is one of the fundamental 
differences between sporting events and other forms of 
entertainment.  Specifically, the uncertainty of outcome 
hypothesis (UOH) states that fans want to see their team 
win in close games and at least contend for championships.  
First iterated in Rottenberg’s (1956) seminal work, Cairns 
(1987) neatly separated the notions of game uncertainty 
(GU), playoff uncertainty (PU), and consecutive season 
uncertainty (CSU).  Ultimately all work on uncertainty of 
any type, even those not conceived in his original 
treatise, relates back to Rottenberg’s pioneering 
contention—the more balanced the league, the greater the 
economic benefit.  In the following paragraphs I review 
some of the previous literature evaluating the impact these 
aspects of uncertainty have had on demand.  My aim in this 
chapter is to build on the existing literature by 
incorporating all three types of uncertainty into a model 
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predicting demand for individual games in Major League 
Baseball (MLB).  Like most questions in sport economics, 
there is a vast literature using MLB as its subject.  As it 
is also the focus of this research, I focus on those 
studies in our review of the literature. 
 
The earliest work on GU evaluates the relative quality 
of teams at the time of the contest (Demmert, 1973; Hill, 
Madura, and Zuber, 1982).  Whether the studies use teams’ 
winning percentage or divisional standing, the theory is 
upheld that demand escalates as teams are more closely 
matched.  By using game attendance, Hill and associates are 
able to attribute changes in demand for individual games to 
variables such as the quality of opponent, games contested 
later in the season, and games played on the weekend.  The 
article is unique, even among later studies, in that it 
quantifies short run demand and, accordingly, can precisely 
identify the particular factors influencing the decision to 
attend each game at any point in the season.  The more 
recent studies (Scully, 1989; Quirk and Fort, 1992; 
Knowles, Sherony, & Haupert, 1992; Humphreys, 2002) use the 
dispersion of winning percents, the most commonly utilized 
measure in competitive balance studies, as a proxy for 
league balance.  Using average annual game attendance as 
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the dependent variable, UOH is tested by the sensitivity of 
attendance to the ratio of actual standard deviation of 
winning percent to the standard deviation of a balanced 
league. 
 
I break briefly from our review of the UOH literature 
on baseball to recognize other contributions to the 
research.  In his review of competitive balance of Dutch 
soccer, Koning (1999) develops a simple model isolating the 
strength of team from that of other factors in team success 
such as home-field-advantage.  He finds that game outcomes 
(including ties) are a function of the relative 
contributions of team quality and the impact of home-field 
advantage as identified by game results of evenly-matched 
teams. 
 
The idea of playoff uncertainty encompasses both a 
team’s competitiveness as it relates to qualifying for 
playoffs and Rottenberg’s original notion of competing for 
championships.  Studies have used both the straightforward 
metric of years per championship (Quirk and Fort, 1992) and 
the more econometrically elegant Gini coefficient of 
championship concentration normalized on seasons (Quirk and 
Fort, 1992).  Much more attention has been paid to the 
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closeness of the home team to qualification for postseason 
play (Hill, Madura, and Zuber, 1982; Baade and Tiehen, 
1990; Butler, 2002; Schmidt and Berri, 2004).  The 
aforementioned studies aim to capture the importance of 
being in contention, while Whitney (1988) uses the simple 
notion of how far the season has progressed and Hill, 
Madura, and Zuber (1982) use games contested in the final 
two-thirds of the season as an indication of the importance 
of games in the minds’ of fans.  The variable of games 
behind the divisional leader is found to be significant in 
several studies (Demmert, 1973; Knowles, et al., 1992), but 
not in Noll’s (1974) analysis of seasonal demand. 
 
Fans of a league want to see “their” team at least 
compete for championships.  Therefore, if there is little 
variation in league standing at the conclusion of 
consecutive seasons, the league is said to be more certain 
and should impact demand adversely.  Previous research has 
employed both correlation of winning percentage in 
consecutive seasons (Butler, 1995) and Gini coefficient of 
team winning percentage (Schmidt and Berri, 2001) as well 
as average standard deviation ratio across teams in 
multiple seasons (Humphreys, 2002) to measure CSU. 
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In an attempt to build on the existing research in the 
area, we call the reader’s attention to the following.  In 
their time-series analysis of MLB, Fort and Lee (working 
paper) point out that while the literature on UOH is 
extensive, there is a dearth of studies that address all 
forms of uncertainty.  Consequently, little can be learned 
of the relative importance of these factors.  In addition, 
few studies look at attendance on a game-by-game basis, 
choosing instead to look solely at average annual 
attendance in spite of the widespread agreement on the 
usefulness of conducting empirical testing on individual 
contests (Szymanski, 2003).  Additionally, the informed 
consumer of sport knows far more about his or her team than 
has been put into previous models, many of which have 
demonstrated weak or limited support for the UOH.  One way 
we can advance in this respect is regarding strength of 
schedule and GU/PU.  Consider the example of two teams 
vying for the last remaining playoff berth, Team A leading 
Team B by one game as each team has two games remaining on 
its schedule.  Schedule, however, makes a real difference 
in the probability of playoff qualification in our 
scenario.  Let’s further suppose that Team A’s final games 
are against the league juggernaut—an opponent with a 
winning percent of 1.000, having won every contest in its 
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season.  Team B’s opponent is completely hapless—a winning 
percent of 0.000, having won not a single game.  The 
introduction of remaining schedule informs a fan’s outlook 
on each team’s chance of qualification.  Yet another 
example of how scheduling comes into play is in past 
performance.  Consider the example of two teams with 
identical records, but Team C has faced teams with a 
combined winning percentage of 0.800 while Team D’s 
opponents have a combined winning percentage of 0.200.  One 
can easily deduce that Team C’s past performance is more 
impressive than Team D’s because it has come against better 
competition.  If teams C and D have similar remaining 
schedules, Team C’s past performance would tell us that it 
is more likely to fare better in future contests.  Thus, 
adding the quality of opponents remaining on the schedule 
and/or previous opponents certainly affects the outlook of 
an informed fan on the likelihood of playoff qualification.  
 
I feel that this study builds on the existing 
literature in a number of ways in order to address these 
issues.  I begin by including applying all three notions of 
uncertainty to MLB.  This will allow us to decipher the 
impact of each one and make more definitive statements 
about how they impact demand.  I also use game attendance 
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rather than annual attendance as the dependent variable in 
this research and bring strength of schedule into the 
equation.  Lastly, I put forth the most thorough 
construction of metrics quantifying game and playoff 
uncertainty to date, employing a probit model of 
anticipated success in remaining contests based on 
performance in previous contests to create measures of GU 
and PU.   
 
The specific purpose of this research is to uncover 
the extent to which uncertainty of outcome plays a role in 
fans’ decisions to attend MLB games.  The broader subject 
is that of consumer preferences.  Demand for any product, 
sporting events included, is influenced by a number of 
factors.  Population and income of the consumer base as 
well as the price of substitutes and expectations about the 
future are all well-established determinants of demand.  
Preferences too are an important factor and this research 
attempts to advance our understanding of consumer 
preferences regarding uncertainty of outcome. 
 
Methods 
If demand is based on all of these factors of 
uncertainty then: 
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Attendance=f(X, game uncertainty, playoff uncertainty, 
within season balance, across season balance) 
where X are factors other than those related to 
uncertainty.  These may be attributes of game quality, 
stadium quality, and fan base quality.  Game quality 
includes temporal factors such as whether the game was 
played during the traditional workweek or on the weekend 
and day or night, as well as the quality of the home and 
away teams.  Note that including the quality of teams 
playing in a given contest is necessary to evaluate for 
uncertainty, or the relative quality of competing teams.  
Stadium quality too is an important input in measuring 
demand as new stadiums have been shown to draw additional 
fans (Coates and Humphreys, 2005).  The final consideration 
is the size and affluence of the fan base.  Larger size and 
wealth of market population where the teams are based 
should influence the demand for the greater.  Thus the 
overall equation for estimating attendance for team i in 
game g of year y can be thought of as: 
321,, XXXZY ygi          (1) 
where Z is UOH, X1 is game quality, X2 is stadium quality, 
and X3 is fan base quality. 
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Turning our attention to UOH, a probit model was 
constructed to find the anticipated result of remaining 
contests and will describe the model before revisiting the 
specific metrics of GU, PU, and CSU.  Because the ultimate 
goal is to separate fan preferences with respect to the 
different types of uncertainty and it is a reasonable 
conjecture that a team’s chances for playoff qualification 
is negligible or at most a small factor in fans attending 
early on in a 162 game MLB season, I chose to only use 
games from July 1 and later, roughly the second half of the 
year.  Thus the sample consists of more than 81 games for 
each club from 1996 to 2007 collected from baseball-
reference.com.  This era was selected for its substance, 
contemporary nature, and the lack of time-series issues.  
The probit uses games previously played in that season to 
predict future outcomes.  As addressed in the previous 
section, knowledgeable consumers of sport are familiar with 
the notion of strength of schedule (SOS).  I incorporate 
this idea into forecasting game outcome.  The home team’s 
winning percentage as well the winning percentage of its 
previous opponents was put into the model along with 
similar inputs for the away team in order to produce the 
probability of a home team win in each contest.  The next 
step involved simulating a winner based on the probability 
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established by the model run according to the Monte Carlo 
method.  The model then simulated the remainder of the 
season one thousand times using a similar design, updating 
all the probabilities daily.  The information generated by 
this probit was used in creating many of the metrics 
described in the remainder of this section. 
 
A number of game uncertainty measures were created to 
separate the various types of expectations. 
GameUncertainty1 = p(win)i,y,g      (2) 
Our first measure, GameUncertainty1, is the probability of 
a win in that contest as established by the probit model 
for team i in year y for game g.  Perhaps the best way to 
think of this measure is the likelihood of a home team win.  
If fans prefer games that the home team is likely to emerge 
victorious, demand will increase as GameUncertainty1 
increases. 
GameUncertainty2 = |1-2*p(win)i, y, g|     (3) 
GameUncertainty2 adds the quality of minimizing when the 
outcome of the game is most uncertain (a value of 0.5).  
Accordingly, if conventional theory on UOH holds true, as 
GameUncertainty2 increases, attendance will decrease. 
TeamUncertainty = |win%i, y – win%i, y-1|    (4) 
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TeamUncertainty measures the change in team quality for the 
home club from one year prior.  What TeamUncertainty will 
elucidate is how fans feel about changes in their team’s 
performance, regardless of whether that change is for the 
better or for the worse.  Therefore, if fans prefer their 
team to perform consistently from season-to-season, 
TeamUncertainty will have a negative impact on demand. 
 
 Playoff uncertainty too is based on the probit model.  
The first two metrics of playoff uncertainty are based on 
the home team’s position in the standings at the outset of 
the day that game is contested.  After the probability of a 
home team win is defined by the probit, Monte Carlo 
simulations are run and team records updated for use by the 
probit in subsequent contests.  Thus the probability of 
playoff qualification can easily be calculated by the model 
going a step further to predict not just that but all 
remaining games—we chose to perform 1,000 simulations—and 
the proportion of the time that the team finishes with a 
record that would qualify for baseball’s postseason 
establishes our first two playoff uncertainty measures. 
PlayoffUncertainty1 = p(playoffs) i, y, g    (5) 
and 
PlayoffUncertainty2 = |1 * 2p(playoffs)i, y, g|   (6) 
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 Similar to the first two metrics of game uncertainty, 
employing both of these PU metrics simultaneously allows us 
to separate whether fans are interested in attending games 
based on the likelihood of their team qualifying for the 
playoffs alone and whether there is increased demand for 
games when the likelihood of playoff qualification is most 
uncertain. 
 
One additional PU metric is added to this study.   
MarginalPlayoffUncertainty = p(playoffs|win g)i, y, g – 
p(playoffs|loss g) i, y, g       (7) 
The model assumes a home team win in game g, then a loss, 
and then estimates the likelihood of the home team 
qualifying for the postseason World Series tournament given 
the two possible outcomes of the game in question.  
MarginalPlayoffUncertainty can be thought of as the 
likelihood of playoff qualification given a win versus a 
loss or the game’s importance in terms of playoff 
qualification. 
 
 Finally, I want to evaluate if the unpredictability of 
the teams qualifying for the playoffs across the league has 
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any bearing on demand for individual games.  Thus we 
introduce 
LeagueUncertainty = variance p(playoffs) n   (8) 
where n is the number of teams in the league.  If fans 
prefer to attend games that the league’s playoff teams are 
less certain, then demand will increase as 
LeagueUncertainty increases. 
 
CSU measures, within season balance and across season 
balance, are constructed according to practices employed 
previously in the UOH literature. 









gy        (9) 
and AcrossSeasonBalance is the correlation in the 
performance of all the league’s teams at game g in year y 
and at game g of year y-1. 
AcrossSeasonBalance = ρ(win%n,y,g , win%n,y-1,g)   (10) 
Consequently, if fans prefer a league that is more 





Data were collected on every regular season MLB game 
contested after July 1 from 1996 through 2007 with 
attendance data collected from baseball-reference.com.  
Win% refers to the home team’s winning percentage at the 
outset of the game being played.  OpponentWin% is the 
visiting team’s winning percentage entering the game.  
Additional indicator variables for the year, month, and day 
of week were also created.  40 stadium dummy variables and 
30 team dummy variables were employed to control for 
stadium and team fixed effects respectively.  The other 
indicator variables we constructed were DayGame, 
representing whether the game was played in the afternoon 
as opposed to at night, and LastYearStadium, 
FirstYearStadium, and SecondYearStadium, in order to 
control for nostalgia and novelty effects of leaving an old 
ballpark and moving into a new one.  TicketPrice accounts 
for the price of attendance.  RunsHome and RunsAway are the 
average runs scored by the home and visiting teams to that 
point in the season.  Finally, the variables of interest—
GameUncertainty1, GameUncertainty2, TeamUncertainty, 
PlayoffUncertainty1, PlayoffUncertainty2, 
MarginalPlayoffUncertainty, LeagueUncertainty, 
WithinSeasonBalance, and AcrossSeasonBalance—were 
constructed as described earlier in the chapter.  
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Postulating that there may be relationships between 
the different types of uncertainty, I constructed a 
correlation matrix of our uncertainty variables.  Due to 
the nature of the outcome variable—individual games—further 
testing for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity was 
performed.  Were there to be correlation in the attendance 
from one game to the next, I would run our demand 
estimation as a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression 
with clustered standard errors rather than an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) model since using OLS under these 
conditions would overstate the significance of the 
variables entered.  The variables entered into the demand 
estimation were as described above with the logarithmic 
form of attendance serving as the dependent variable. 
 
Results 
Summary statistics of the probit are found in Table 
4.1.  With 14,756 observations from the 1996-2007 seasons, 
the probit used home team winning percentage, home team 
strength of schedule, road team winning percentage, and 
road team strength of schedule to successfully predict 
56.53% of the game outcomes.  A graphical representation of 
how successful the probit was in its predictions after X 
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games in the season is provided in Figure 4.1.  It appears 
as though the model improves slightly as the season wears 
on, perhaps as a result of having more information on each 
competing team.  The initial variability can be explained 
by the smaller sample of games—only occasionally would a 
home team have played fewer than 80 games by July 1.  All 
of the four variables entered into the probit produced 
estimates in the expected direction (i.e., the higher the 
winning percentage of the road team, the lower the 
probability of a home team win in that contest), but only 
records of the competing teams themselves were significant 
in the model.  This result indicates that it cannot be 
stated definitively that a team’s strength of schedule 
contributes to the expected outcome of a Major League 
Baseball game.  Parameter estimates, marginal effects, and 
t-statistics are provided in Table 4.2. 
 
These results were then utilized in the demand 
estimation to measure GU and PU.  Summary statistics are 
available in Table 4.3.  The uncertainty variables and 
winning percentage were then tested for correlation with 
the results depicted in Table 4.4.  A surprising few of the 
variables were highly correlated.  It is worth noting that 
most correlated variables in the set were GU1 and GU2 
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(r=0.616), GU1 and PU1 (r=0.568), and GU2 and PU1 
(r=0.471). 
 
After conducting tests of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity, shown in Table 4.5, it was determined 
that a GLS model with clustered standard errors was 
appropriate on account of the autocorrelation.  In other 
words, the assumption that the demand for a contest and the 
game previous are independent could not be made.  Thus GLS 
is used checking only for first order correlation and the 
results of this regression shown in Table 4.6.  Over two-
thirds of the variability in attendance can be explained by 
the model (R2=0.67).  The log form of attendance is used as 
the dependent variable in the equation in accordance with 
convention in estimating demand in sports research.  The 
reference game in this model is a Sunday game played in 
July of 19973.  I first cover the control variables.  As 
expected, attendance decreased for games played on 
weekdays.  Interestingly, all else equal, July games are 
more highly attended than those in August, September, and 
October, there was a higher demand for Saturday games than 
Sunday games, and night games were preferable to those 
played during the day.  Additionally, year, team, and 
                     
3 Arizona and Bank One Ballpark are the reference team and stadium 
respectively. 
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individual park effects are accounted for and easily 
interpreted in the model results table.  Consistent with 
previous research on the subject, demand increased for 
games played in the final year a stadium’s use and in new 
stadiums.  Runs per game and opponent’s run per game are 
also included in the model as previous research has 
demonstrated fan preference for high scoring contests 
(Winfree, McCluskey, Mittelhammer, and Fort, 2004; 
Domazlicky and Kerr, 1990).  Interestingly, neither home 
nor road scoring was found to be significant in the GLS 
model.  Home team quality was positive and significant in 
the model.  In other words, the better the home team’s 
winning percentage, the more fans will come to the stadium.  
By contrast, road team quality too was positive, but 
nowhere near significant.  We are left to conclude that 
fans care greatly about the quality of their home team, but 
the same cannot be said about the visiting squad. 
 
We now turn to our variables of interest beginning 
with those variables related to game uncertainty.  Neither 
GU1, the probability of a home team win in that contest, 
nor GU2, the uncertainty of the contest, are found to be 
significant.  Accordingly, it cannot be concluded that fans 
prefer games in which their team is favored.  Similarly, we 
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cannot conclude that fans prefer contests of more evenly-
matched teams.  Both of these findings diverge from 
conventional thinking and research on UOH.  TU, the 
difference in winning percent for the home team from one 
year prior, is negative and significant.  What this speaks 
to is fan expectations.  Since demand decreases as success 
changes, it can be inferred that fans prefer that their 
team’s performance remains consistent from year-to-year. 
 
PU1, the probability of playoff qualification, is 
positive and significant in the model.  This means that 
fans prefer attending games when their team is more likely 
to garner a postseason berth and are less likely to attend 
when their team’s chance of making the playoff decreases.  
PU2, the uncertainty of playoff qualification, is not 
significant in the model.  According to this result, it 
cannot be stated that fans prefer to attend contests as 
their team is on the playoff “bubble.”  What is significant 
in the model and follows traditional thinking on UOH is 
MarginalPU.  The model shows that fans recognize game 
importance in terms of playoff qualification and prefer 
contests when more rides on winning and losing that game. 
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We now will examine the uncertainty variables that 
apply to not just the team but the league as a whole.  
LeagueUncertainty, the SD of playoff chances for all teams, 
is not a significant factor in estimating demand.  This 
challenges the idea that fans prefer when the league 
champion is less predictable, controlling for their team’s 
success.  So too WithinSeasonBalance, estimated by the SD 
of all team’s winning percentage at that point in the 
season, is not significant in the model.  Were this 
significant, we could have affirmed the longstanding 
contention that consumers prefer more balanced leagues.  
Thus this result presents a strong challenge to that 
assertion.  Finally, the variable AcrossSeasonBalance, 
approximated by the correlation of winning percentages for 
all teams at the outset of the game and one year prior, was 
also not significant.  I therefore do not maintain that 
league consistency across seasons plays a role in fans’ 
decisions to attend MLB games. 
 
While steadfast in this approach and its directing the 
use of GLS because of reasons presented earlier in the 
paper, I nonetheless address OLS findings on these 
identical variables.  Results for the just the UOH 
variables are presented in Table 4.7.  In contrast to the 
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GLS results, which showed the significance of PU1, 
MarginalPU, and TeamUncertainty, using OLS to find what 
aspects of UOH influence demand for individual MLB games, 
all of the UOH variables were significant contributors with 
the exception of LeagueUncertainty and AcrossSeasonBalance.  
This is noteworthy principally because the standard OLS 
approach to questions of UOH would have given undue 
significance to GU1, GU2, PU2, and WithinSeasonBalance that 
is actually attributable to the serial correlation in 
demand for successive games. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
This chapter explores how traditional and novel 
proxies of uncertainty influence demand for MLB contests.  
It is the first study in many years to use game-by-game 
attendance as the dependent term and first among all the 
uncertainty literature to quantify the probability of game 
success and playoff qualification via a probit model.  The 
probit demonstrates that both the home team and road team’s 
winning percentage are important in predicting game 
outcomes, while strength-of-schedule is not significant for 
either team.  Furthermore, a team’s probability of making 
the playoffs, the importance of the game in terms of 
playoff qualification, and the change in winning percentage 
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from one year prior are the significant uncertainty factors 
in estimating demand for MLB regular-season games.  I feel 
this research adds to the rich canon of work on uncertainty 
of outcome and provides a springboard for further 
exploration on a number of related questions. 
 
Fort (2006) emphasizes the need for the examination of 
UOH principles across more than just MLB.  I offer this 
first analysis of utilizing a probit model to ascertain the 
actual probability of game and playoff success at the time 
of any contest and echo the recommendation to expand the 
use of this model to other leagues. 
 
It is also evident that many of the new metrics 
introduced in this chapter fall outside of the GU/PU/CSU 
paradigm.  For example, what I call “Team Uncertainty” is 
connected both to the idea of GU and CSU.  So while the 
metrics are named for their resemblance to the traditional 
approach to parsing out different types of uncertainty, it 
may be useful to merely separate the notions quality and 
uncertainty. 
 
Finally, I reflect back on the utility of this type of 
analysis.  As we learn more about fan preferences, we 
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consider how practitioners in the sport industry can make 
use of this information.  In this case, it is apparent that 
those who create the MLB schedule can look to this study’s 
findings to, at their leisure, maximize fan welfare or 
owner profits.  In either case, all else equal it may be 
advisable to construct a schedule that projects to maximize 
games of great playoff importance.  No less important are 
the implications regarding fans’ desire for consistent team 
performance from season to season. 
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 Table 4.1 
Summary Statistics of Winning Percent and Strength of 
Schedule 
Parameter   Min.  Max.   Mean  SD 
Home Team Win%  0.238  0.754  0.500  0.074 
Home Team SOS  0.456  0.540  0.500  0.011 
Road Team Win%  0.238  0.765  0.501  0.074 
Road Team SOS  0.451  0.539  0.500  0.011 
 
Predicted Probabilities 0.463  0.537 
Actual Probabilities  0.463  0.536 













































































Probit Model of MLB Contests 
Parameter  Estimate SD  T  Marginal Effect 
Constant  0.256  0.719  0.357  0.102 
Home Team Win% 1.535*** 0.162  9.494  0.609 
Home Team SOS 0.778  1.083  0.719  0.309 
Road Team Win% -1.737*** 0.163  -10.677 -0.690 





Summary Statistics for Factors Affecting Demand in MLB 
Parameter   Min.  Max.  Mean  SD 
Win%    0.238  0.754  0.501  0.074 
Opponent’s Win%  0.238  0.765  0.500  0.075 
August    0  1  0.343  0.475 
September   0  1  0.317  0.465 
October   0  1  0.018  0.132 
Monday   0  1  0.098  0.297 
Tuesday   0  1  0.144  0.351 
Wednesday   0  1  0.144  0.351 
Thursday   0  1  0.123  0.328 
Friday    0  1  0.160  0.367 
Saturday   0  1  0.166  0.372 
Day Game   0  1  0.318  0.466 
1998    0  1  0.083  0.275 
1999    0  1  0.095  0.293 
2000    0  1  0.094  0.293 
2001    0  1  0.093  0.290 
2002    0  1  0.092  0.289 
2003    0  1  0.091  0.288 
2004    0  1  0.092  0.289 
2005    0  1  0.090  0.286 
2006    0  1  0.093  0.291 
2007    0  1  0.093  0.290 
Turner    0  1  0.034  0.181 
Camden Yards  0  1  0.034  0.181 
Fenway   0  1  0.035  0.183 
Comiskey   0  1  0.034  0.181 
Wrigley   0  1  0.034  0.181 
Riverfront   0  1  0.019  0.185 
Great American BP  0  1  0.016  0.124 
Jacobs    0  1  0.035  0.183 
Coors    0  1  0.035  0.183 
Tiger    0  1  0.009  0.093 
Comerica   0  1  0.025  0.158 
Dolphins   0  1  0.033  0.178 
Astrodome   0  1  0.009  0.096 
Minute Maid   0  1  0.025  0.157 
Kaufmann   0  1  0.033  0.180 
Angels    0  1  0.034  0.182 
Dodgers   0  1  0.034  0.182 
Milwaukee Cty  0  1  0.012  0.111 
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Miller    0  1  0.022  0.146 
Metrodome   0  1  0.033  0.180 
Olympic   0  1  0.021  0.143 
Shea    0  1  0.034  0.180 
Yankee    0  1  0.035  0.183 
McAfee   0  1  0.035  0.183 
Veterans’   0  1  0.021  0.144 
Citizens Bank   0  1  0.012  0.110 
Three Rivers   0  1  0.012  0.109 
PNC    0  1  0.021  0.145 
Jack Murphy   0  1  0.021  0.144 
Petco    0  1  0.012  0.111 
Kingdome   0  1  0.006  0.078 
Safeco    0  1  0.028  0.164 
Candlestick   0  1  0.008  0.091 
AT&T    0  1  0.025  0.155 
Old Busch   0  1  0.029  0.167 
New Busch   0  1  0.006  0.179 
Tropicana   0  1  0.028  0.165 
Arlington   0  1  0.034  0.182 
Skydome   0  1  0.033  0.178 
ATL    0  1  0.032  0.175 
BAL    0  1  0.034  0.181 
BOS    0  1  0.034  0.182 
CHA    0  1  0.034  0.182 
CHN    0  1  0.033  0.179 
CIN    0  1  0.033  0.180 
CLE    0  1  0.034  0.181 
COL    0  1  0.033  0.179 
DET    0  1  0.034  0.182 
FLA    0  1  0.033  0.178 
HOU    0  1  0.032  0.176 
KCA    0  1  0.034  0.182 
LAA    0  1  0.034  0.181 
LAN    0  1  0.033  0.179 
MIL    0  1  0.033  0.180 
MIN    0  1  0.035  0.183 
MON    0  1  0.025  0.157 
NYA    0  1  0.034  0.181 
NYN    0  1  0.032  0.176 
OAK    0  1  0.033  0.178 
PHI    0  1  0.033  0.179 
PIT    0  1  0.033  0.179 
SD    0  1  0.034  0.180 
SEA    0  1  0.034  0.181 
SF    0  1  0.034  0.182 
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STL    0  1  0.033  0.178 
TB    0  1  0.031  0.173 
TEX    0  1  0.034  0.180 
TOR    0  1  0.034  0.182 
Last Year Stadium  0  1  0.044  0.205 
First Year Stadium  0  1  0.036  0.185 
Second Year Stadium  0  1  0.030  0.170 
Ticket Price   8.22  47.71  18.213  6.272 
Runs    3.163  6.625  4.843  0.513 
Opponent’s Runs  3.157  6.654  4.834  0.521 
Game Uncertainty1  0.307  0.755  0.537  0.068 
Game Uncertainty2  0  0.510  0.125  0.091 
Team Uncertainty  -0.268  0.249  0.000  0.076 
Playoff Uncertainty1  0  1  0.270  0.362 
Playoff Uncertainty2  0  1  0.808  0.289 
Marginal PU   -0.012  0.515  0.035  0.051 
League Uncertainty  0.257  0.460  0.366  0.041 
Within Season Balance 0.251  0.262  0.257  0.002 







Correlation Matrix of Uncertainty Variables 
GU1 GU2 TU PU1 PU2 MPU LU WSB ASB Win% 
GU1 1 0.616 0.343 0.568 -0.287 0.260 0.019 -0.008 -0.012 0.694 
GU2 0.616 1 0.200 0.471 -0.126 0.079 0.035 0.056 -0.007 0.420 
TU 0.343 0.200 1 0.377 -0.231 0.203 0.013 -0.014 -0.023 0.504 
PU1 0.568 0.471 0.377 1 -0.347 0.338 0.013 -0.004 -0.008 0.810 
PU2 -0.287 -0.126 -0.231 -0.347 1 -0.825 0.297 0.009 0.026 -0.415 
MPU 0.260 0.079 0.203 0.338 -0.825 1 -0.163 -0.042 0.017 0.404 
LU 0.019 0.035 0.013 0.013 0.297 -0.163 1 0.019 0.023 0.015 
WSB -0.008 0.056 -0.014 -0.004 0.009 -0.042 0.019 1 0.258 -0.011 
ASB -0.012 -0.007 -0.023 -0.008 0.026 0.017 0.023 0.258 1 -0.021 
Win% 0.694 0.420 0.504 0.810 -0.415 0.404 0.015 -0.011 -0.021 1 
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Table 4.5 
Tests of Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity 




Constant   5.162   0.593  8.704 
 
Linear Error   -0.928   0.117  -7.947 
 





Constant   0.001   0.002  0.738 
 





Generalized Least Squares Results with Clustered Standard Errors 
Demand Estimation for UOH and MLB Games 
Parameter    Estimate   SD  T 
Constant    8.413***   1.098  7.660 
Win%     1.525**   0.714  2.136 
Opponent’s Win%   0.282    0.750  0.375 
August     -0.017**   0.008  -2.033 
September    -0.078***   0.017  -4.511 
October    -0.079*   0.044  -1.814 
Monday    -0.189***   0.012  -15.260 
Tuesday    -0.194***   0.011  -17.453 
Wednesday    -0.172***   0.010  -16.722 
Thursday    -0.155***   0.010  -16.292 
Friday     -0.043***   0.010  -4.437 
Saturday    0.072***   0.008  9.461 
Day Game    -0.026***   0.007  -3.684 
1998     -0.004    0.048  -0.083 
1999     -0.019    0.049  -0.396 
2000     -0.046    0.052  -0.886 
2001     -0.054    0.049  -1.101 
2002     -0.134**   0.053  -2.521 
2003     -0.123**   0.052  -2.371 
2004     -0.066    0.054  -1.208 
2005     -0.092*   0.056  -1.664 
2006     -0.057    0.061  -0.941 
2007     -0.016    0.058  -0.279 
Turner     -0.088**   0.044  -1.990 
Camden Yards   0.106    0.070  1.525 
Fenway    -0.359***   0.092  -3.905 
Comiskey    -0.309***   0.057  -5.446 
Wrigley    0.098*    0.051  1.942 
Riverfront    -0.184***   0.053  -3.484 
Great American BP   -0.167***   0.043  -3.844 
Jacobs     -0.064    0.066  -0.969 
Coors     0.172**   0.070  2.464 
Tiger     -0.214*   0.116  -1.837 
Comerica    -0.120**   0.056  -2.162 
Dolphins    -0.483***   0.087  -5.530 
Astrodome    -0.165***   0.051  -3.249 
Minute Maid    0.008    0.042  0.190 
Kaufmann    -0.352***   0.047  -7.494 
 106
Angels     0.003    0.069  0.039 
Dodgers    0.247***   0.039  6.331 
Milwaukee Cty   -0.246***   0.069  -3.574 
Miller     0.005    0.043  0.110 
Metrodome    -0.349***   0.075  -4.675 
Olympic    -0.874***   0.095  -9.153 
Shea     -0.013    0.056  -0.213 
Yankee     0.029    0.070  0.415 
McAfee    -0.371***   0.058  -6.447 
Veterans    -0.239***   0.058  -4.093 
Citizens Bank    -0.067    0.050  -1.349 
Three Rivers    -0.321***   0.049  -6.515 
PNC     -0.193***   0.050  -3.865 
Jack Murphy    -0.041    0.047  -0.876 
Petco     -0.028    0.051  -0.544 
Kingdome    -0.035    0.111  -0.316 
Safeco     0.034    0.050  0.686 
Candlestick    -0.247***   0.062  -4.008 
AT&T     0.097**   0.048  2.036 
Old Busch    0.067    0.058  1.158 
New Busch    -0.071    0.106  -0.670 
Tropicana    -0.448***   0.059  -7.604 
Arlington    -0.051    0.049  -1.037 
Skydome    -0.160***   0.054  -2.980 
ATL     0.068***   0.024  2.871 
BAL     0.032    0.030  1.069 
BOS     0.147***   0.031  4.694 
CHA     -0.010    0.030  -0.340 
CHN     0.192***   0.024  8.011 
CIN     0.049**   0.021  2.314 
CLE     0.056*    0.029  1.926 
COL     0.001    0.025  0.046 
DET     -0.005    0.029  -0.168 
FLA     -0.021    0.022  -0.956 
HOU     0.007    0.021  0.325 
KCA     0.002    0.030  0.073 
LAA     0.000    0.029  -0.004 
LAN     0.073***   0.021  3.489 
MIL     -0.024    0.021  -1.160 
MIN     -0.015    0.027  -0.541 
MON     -0.058**   0.027  -2.110 
NYA     0.251***   0.033  7.555 
NYN     0.068***   0.019  3.638 
OAK     0.017    0.027  0.631 
PHI     -0.021    0.026  -0.815 
PIT     -0.004    0.023  -0.191 
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SD     0.015    0.019  0.784 
SEA     0.059**   0.027  2.165 
SF     0.082***   0.021  3.962 
STL     0.109***   0.026  4.219 
TB     -0.009    0.030  -0.281 
TEX     -0.022    0.030  -0.739 
TOR     -0.005    0.028  -0.180 
Last Year Stadium   0.058**   0.027  2.137 
First Year Stadium   0.138***   0.036  3.779 
Second Year Stadium   0.105**   0.045  2.358 
Ticket Price    0.013***   0.003  4.381 
Runs     0.019    0.024  0.802 
Opponent’s Runs   0.016    0.010  1.589 
Game Certainty1   0.070    1.154  0.061 
Game Certainty2   0.027    0.062  0.442 
Team Uncertainty   -0.751***   0.118  -6.376 
Playoff Uncertainty1   0.058*    0.035  1.669 
Playoff Uncertainty2   0.016    0.028  0.554 
Marginal PU    0.383***   0.123  3.124 
League Uncertainty   0.142    0.198  0.720 
Within Season Balance  2.556    3.114  0.821 








Ordinary Least Squares Results 
Demand Estimation for UOH and MLB Games 
Parameter    Estimate   SD  T 
 
GameUncertainty1   1.482**   0.571  2.593 
 
GameUncertainty2   0.062*    0.034  1.804 
 
TeamUncertainty   -0.907***   0.039  23.007 
 
PlayoffUncertainty1   0.071***   0.012  6.012 
 
PlayoffUncertainty2   0.060***   0.015  4.022 
 
MarginalPU    0.745***   0.080  9.311 
 
LeagueUncertainty   0.159    0.120  1.324 
 
WithinSeasonBalance   4.301**   1.706  2.520 
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Summary of Findings 
This dissertation takes a look at three types of 
issues in MLB related to demand.  Chapter II focuses on the 
revenue change associated with the major policy change MLB 
undertook in testing for performance-enhancing drugs and 
implementing penalties on the offending players.  The 
impact of the findings extend to most if not all sports as 
Major League Baseball is not the sole organization whose 
athletes have used PEDs to gain the upper hand on their 
competition.  Chapter III looks at consumer discrimination 
with respect to international players in MLB.  I find an 
evolution of the effect of foreign-born players on consumer 
demand.  Over the course of two decades, fans went from 
preferring American-born players to favoring those born 
abroad.  A follow-up study is warranted since the degree of 
preference flattens out in the final few seasons included 
in the study.  Chapter IV tests nine types of uncertainty 
in MLB contests.  Using probit analysis to establish 
 112
probabilities of winning a given game and, along with the 
probit, Monte Carlo simulations to determine the 
probability of playoff qualification, the nine uncertainty 
metrics were placed in a regression analysis with game 
attendance as the dependent variable.  The analysis shows 
how fans turn out in greater numbers for games in which the 
outcome is of great importance in terms of playoff 
qualification and when their team is more likely to qualify 
for the playoffs as well as that fans react adversely to 
changes in team performance from the previous season.  
These findings are consistent with some of the recent work 
on UOH.  Just as interesting are the metrics not found to 
significantly impact demand, contradicting some of the 
established theories of fan preferences for close games and 
playoff uncertainty. 
 
 The totality of these studies representing three 
different areas of research on demand in MLB is a well-
rounded view of the types of studies that aim to gauge fan 
preferences.  The decision to implement drug testing is one 
of many policies the league has enacted.  Any of these 
policies can be looked at in a manner similar to that in 
the Chapter II to measure the impact on revenues.  So too 
the Chapter III represents a type of inquiry undertaken by 
 113
 114
sport researchers.  The presence of foreign players is 
notable, and having increased over time, warrants the same 
attention of integration in estimating demand.  Finally, 
the longstanding notion that fans desire uncertainty is 
tested in the Chapter IV.  This is something that is unique 
to sport, as in most forms of entertainment the outcome has 
been decided in advance.  Their place within different 
subsets of the research on sport economics notwithstanding, 
each of these chapters reveals to us something about fan 
preferences and their impact on demand. 
